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Centre (WODC), Dutch Ministry of Justice
The ability of political systems to adopt policy reforms contributes to their internal stability. This article
analyses 29 anti-corruption reforms in seven sub-Saharan countries. It seeks to explain the level of
adopted reform in these countries from conflicts of interests between policy actors. Two groups of policy
actors are distinguished: veto-players (endowed with an exercisable veto) and stakeholders (with an inter-
est in policy reforms). A veto-player model is applied and extended with effects of (a) policy polariza-
tion between all policy actors and (b) institutional fractionalization between veto-players and
stakeholders. The authors hypothesize a negative (interaction) effect of these variables with the win-set
on the level of reform. As expected, the core variable of the veto-player model, size of the win-set of the
status quo, significantly and positively affects the level of adopted reform. Unexpectedly, the number
of veto-players has a significant and positive effect on the level of reform, whereas polarization among
veto-players does not affect the level of reform. In contrast, fractionalization between veto-players and
stakeholders has a significant negative direct effect on the level of anti-corruption reform and a weak
interaction effect with size of the win-set. Thus, even when veto-players agree on the desirability of anti-
corruption reforms, the adoption of reforms is obstructed by a high level of fractionalization between
veto-players and stakeholders. 
* Our work is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project
CIT-2-CT-2004-50604 funded by the European Com-
mission DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. An
earlier version of this article was presented at the summer
meeting of the European network on polarization and con-
flict, Konstanz, 3–5 June 2005. We thank Gerald Schneider,
Margit Bussmann and three anonymous reviewers for their
Introduction
The prosperity of nations highly depends on
the ability of their governments to adopt
reforms in the political-economic and admin-
istrative system (Geddes, 1991; Krueger,
1993; Rodrik, 1993, 1996; Treisman, 2007).
Reforms are obstructed by social and political
conflict (Cox & McCubbins, 2001; Tsebelis,
2002). For example, Alesina & Drazen
(1991) show that high-level distributional
conflicts delay the adoption of reforms.
In the present article, we study the level
of reform expressed in anti-corruption
helpful comments and suggestions. The authors acknow-
ledge financial support from the World Bank Institute.
Data used in this article and appendices with interview
logs, a list of background documents, and a description of
the dataset can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/
datasets. Correspondence: r.torenvlied@uu.nl or c.m.klein-
haarhuis@uu.n.
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decisionmaking in seven sub-Saharan African
countries and explain these reforms from
conflicts of interests within the political
system. In the year 2000, for example, Kenya
formulated a ‘National Action Plan’ for anti-
corruption reforms. Indeed, some extensive
reforms were put on the agenda: the creation
of a fully independent Kenyan Anti Cor-
ruption Agency (KACA), full control over
parliamentary resources, the inclusion of the
private sector in the legal definition of cor-
ruption, the adoption of a ‘list of shame’, and
the strict prosecution of (early) suspects of
corruption. However, the powerful govern-
ment aimed to preserve the status quo, sup-
ported by president Daniel Arap Moi, the
judiciary, the ruling party (the Kenya African
National Union, KANU), the Finance
Department and the anti-corruption agency.
The parliamentary opposition, civil society
and the donor community (notably the IMF
and the World Bank) formed a reform-oriented
coalition. After a long debate, the Kenyan
authorities decided to grant full control only
over parliamentary resources. Apparently,
powerful ‘vested interests’ blocked the other
reform proposals (see Krueger, 1993; Rodrik,
1993; Geddes, 1991; Rose-Ackerman, 1999;
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
The literature on reforms primarily
focuses on democratic institutions to explain
the translation of societal conflict into the
peaceful adoption of policy reforms. However,
in relatively ‘weak states’ – such as sub-
Saharan African countries – political institu-
tions do not stimulate the building of political
constituencies or the promotion of political
competition (La Ferrara & Bates, 2001).
Thus, a system of checks of balances between
elected officials is absent. However, the exist-
ing institutions in these states still assign
veto-power to specific actors in the policy-
making process (Cox & McCubbins, 2001;
Tsebelis, 2002; Torenvlied & Haarhuis,
2004). Individual or collective veto-players
are the actors that have to agree on proposed
changes (Tsebelis, 2002: 2). Even in auto-
cratic regimes, multiple veto-players exist who
may block a change from the status quo
under high levels of conflict. Because the con-
cept of veto-power does not distinguish 
between democratic and autocratic regimes,
we apply it as a general framework for the
comparative analysis of the reforms under
study. The central argument of veto-player
theory is that the size of the win-set of the
status quo among veto-players positively affects
the potential for reform (Tsebelis, 2002).
The strength of the veto-player argument
for comparative analysis brings with it one
disadvantage: it does not take into account
the richer and broader constellation of pref-
erences in the policy process. For example,
anti-corruption policymaking in sub-
Saharan Africa involves other stakeholders
from civil society (churches, voluntary organ-
izations, nongovernmental institutions) and
donor actors (bilateral donor countries and
multilateral organizations, such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank).
These organizations would strongly benefit
from a change from the status quo, but they
have no formal power to veto proposals that
aim to preserve the status quo.
In this article, we argue that the presence
of these stakeholders affects the choice of
veto-players to exercise their veto. We hypothe-
size that two indicators for conflict reduce
the (positive) effect of the size of the win-set
of the status quo on the level of reform: (a)
the level of polarization among all actors and
(b) the level of institutional fractionalization
between stakeholders and veto-players. The
concept of polarization builds upon two
mechanisms: (a) identification between mem-
bers of different groups in reform policy-
making and (b) alienation between members
of these groups (Esteban & Ray, 1994).
Polarization research combines these two
mechanisms and relates them to societal con-
flict. In the context of reforms, we define
policy polarization as the extent to which
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groups of actors are homogenous with respect
to the positions within their reference group
and heterogeneous with respect to positions
across groups. The reference group could
contain all actors sharing a common policy
position, but could also be defined by exogen-
ous variables. When we study polarization
between two groups (veto-players and stake-
holders), the measure of polarization reduces
to a weighted measure of (institutional)
fractionalization.
A highly polarized or fractionalized policy
debate reflects the difficulty for actors to
make concessions beyond group boundaries.
Within-group identification between con-
testing groups could fuel polarization, causing
discontent and conflict (Esteban & Ray,
1994). McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal (2006:
176–183) observe that polarization nega-
tively affects policy change and law produc-
tion. Thus, even when veto-players agree to
adopt reforms (Tsebelis, 2002), policy polar-
ization would negatively affect the level of
policy reform.
We test hypotheses on a pooled dataset of
29 anti-corruption reforms adopted in seven
sub-Saharan African countries: Bénin,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania
and Uganda. At the start of this millennium,
these were the countries that publicly debated
anti-corruption reforms (Haarhuis, 2005).
Anti-corruption reforms are especially suit-
able for this study because the serious reduc-
tion of pervasive corruption unavoidably
entails significant changes in the administra-
tive structure of a nation. After introducing
variables derived from veto-player theory, we
add direct effects and interaction effects of
policy polarization and institutional fraction-
alization. A generalization of findings beyond
these countries is not the aim of this article.
Spatial Model of Reform
In each country, reform policymaking re-
volves around substantive reform issues,
which represent specific facets of reform. We
assume that a policy space rm exists for each
separate reform issue, with m1 dimen-
sions, so that each reform issue is represented
by a one-dimensional reform scale r. A vari-
able xr [0, 100] is the reform scale variable,
which represents the substantive values of
alternative policies relative to two extreme
policies with values of 0 and 100, respectively.
For matters of simplification, we assume that
the reform scale xr reflects more substantial
reforms when moving from left to right. In
addition, we assume that the status quo xrSQ
reflects the situation of ‘no reform’, so that
xrSQ0. Actors, aA, hold a policy position
on reform issue r, denoted by xar, which is
their ideal point on the one-dimensional
policy scale. We assume that actors have
single-peaked preference functions, monoto-
nically decreasing from the policy position.
Thus, the higher the value of the policy posi-
tion, the more reform-oriented the actor is.
Likewise, the value of the reform policy
xr*Pr reflects the level of reform.
The Veto-Player Model of Policy Reform
We assume that policy reforms are the out-
come of collective decisionmaking between
self-interested veto-players (Tsebelis, 1999).
Veto players – denoted by v, where vV – have
power over domestic agenda-setting and
decisionmaking, according to the existing
formal and informal rules. Examples of veto-
players in the context of anti-corruption
reforms are the president, the ruling party,
governmental departments, anti-corruption
agencies and the public prosecutor (see
Haarhuis & Torenvlied, 2006). In addition,
other policy actors are involved in anti-
corruption policymaking: stakeholders – denoted
by s, where sS. These are interest organ-
izations actively involved in reform policy-
making, but not endowed with veto-power
(see Laumann & Knoke, 1987; Cox &
McCubbins, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, 2003).
Examples of these interest organizations are
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organizations from civil society, bilateral
donor countries and multilateral donor insti-
tutions, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. The groups of
veto-players and stakeholders are mutually
exclusive subsets of the set of actors A, so that
SVØ and SVA. For each reform
issue r, veto players have a most preferred
reform policy xvr .
In veto-player theory, the main deter-
minant of policy change is the size of the win-
set of the status quo among veto-players. The
preference function of a veto-player defines
his set of alternative reform policies Pvr (xvr),
which he strictly prefers over the status quo
xrSQ he win-set of the status quo WrxrSQ is
the intersection of all the preference func-
tions of veto-players in decisive coalitions. If
the win-set of the status quo is empty, no
alternative reform policy is able to beat the
status quo. Because unanimity requires the
consent of all veto-players, the win-set of the
status quo is fully determined by the most
conservative veto-player L, who holds a
policy position x Lvr. If the most conservative
veto-player holds a policy position that sup-
ports at least some level of reform (xLvrx rSQ,
the size of the win-set is 2x Lvr. Under the con-
dition 2x Lvr0, the gates of decisionmaking
will be opened with the consent of all veto-
players. Subsequently, a policy reform of the
size xr* is adopted, where x r* [0,…,2x Lvr].
Thus, the size of the win-set of the status quo
positively affects the level of reform, although
the existence of a non-empty win-set is a nec-
essary, but not sufficient condition for policy
reform (Tsebelis, 2002: 32). We formulate
the veto-player hypothesis:
H1A (Win-Set of the Status Quo): The size of
the win-set of the status quo positively
affects the level of policy reform.
Cox & McCubbins (2001) discuss the effect
of the number of veto-players. They assume
that an increase in the number of veto-players
raises the transaction costs of decisionmaking
and reduces the marginal utility of reforms,
thus making reforms less likely. Moreover, an
increase in the number of veto-players would
increase the likelihood that some veto-player
has a policy position most close to the status
quo (that is, outside the ‘unanimity core’ of
the win-set of the status quo). According to
the ‘absorption rule’ (Tsebelis, 2002: 28),
only these veto-players are essential. Hence,
the presence of more veto-players will be
associated with smaller sizes of the win-set of
the status quo. Although the latter effect of
the number of veto-players will disappear
when controlling for the size of the win-set
of the status quo, the former remains. Thus,
we obtain the following hypothesis:
H1B(Number of veto-players): The number of
veto-players negatively affects the level of
policy reform.
Effects of Policy Polarization and 
Institutional Fractionalization
In the previous section, we discussed that the
existence of a non-empty win-set is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, condition for reform.
Within the subset of policy positions,
[0,…,2x Lvr], the adopted reform x*r is un-
determined. Hence, even when the win-set
of the status quo is non-empty – all veto-
players agreeing to adopt reforms – additional
conflict will (negatively) affect the level of
reform adopted. Thus, we need to consider
conflict in the political system beyond the
subset of veto-players and include a broader
set of stakeholders into our analysis.
Although these stakeholders have no formal
veto power over agenda-setting and deci-
sionmaking, they do express an interest in
reform policymaking with a preference xsr.
For example, although the World Bank and
other international donor organizations or
countries express a strong preference for
domestic anti-corruption reforms, they cannot
exercise any veto, however strong their threat
may be to withdraw international aid. The
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same could be argued for organizations in
civil society, such as churches, who lobby for
substantive policy reforms.
Political conflict between stakeholders and
veto-players is likely to interact with the size
of the win-set: it would reduce the level of
reform even if all veto-players agree that some
level of reform is desirable. The theory of
polarization offers two mechanisms that,
when combined, offer a theoretical under-
pinning for this conflict. The first mechanism
intragroup identification, the second inter-
group alienation (Esteban & Ray, 1994).
Polarization captures the effective antagonisms
between groups: polarization becomes larger
when group members become more similar
and when distances between groups increase.
Because polarization crucially depends upon
the definition of groups, we develop two meas-
ures of polarization – each based upon a dis-
tinct definition of groups of policy actors. The
first measure captures policy polarization
between coalitions of policy actors with iden-
tical policy positions. The second measure
captures institutional fractionalization between
veto-players and stakeholders.
Policy polarization captures the effective
antagonisms between coalitions c of policy
actors with similar preferences, where 
c{c, d,…, C }. A policy coalition c has two
properties: (a) a policy position xr on the
reform scale and (b) a relative proportion c
of all policy actors i who hold this position on
the reform issue. Thus, we obtain as many
policy coalitions as there exist policy positions
with policy position xc and relative group
sizes c,, where cc1. Equation (1) displays
the measure of policy polarization P adapted
from Esteban & Ray (1994), who show that
this measure satisfies three basic axioms of
polarization and is invariant to population size.
(1)
where: 0c , d1; 01.6.
Parameter  adjusts for the level of identi-
fication within the policy coalitions and can
be interpreted as the ‘polarization sensitivity’
of the measure (Esteban & Ray, 1994: 834).
It ranges between 0 and 1.6 to satisfy the three
axioms and the requirement of invariance to
population size. For 0, the polarization
measure equals the Gini index of inequality.
If policy polarization is high, different
coalitions of policy actors (with mixed com-
binations of veto-players and stakeholders)
will strongly identify with highly different
reform policies. This will fuel policy conflict,
even when veto-players all agree that reforms
are desirable and the win-set of the status
quo is considerable. In highly polarized set-
tings, strong within-coalition identification
makes it highly difficult to reach agreement
with homogenous and distant other coali-
tions. The adopted policy could reflect a
lower level of reform than implied by the size
of the win-set of the status positions. Conse-
quently, we expect a negative interaction effect
between policy polarization and size of the
win-set of the status quo on the level of
policy reform.
H2 (Policy polarization): The effect of size of
the win-set of the status quo on the level
of policy reform is negatively affected by
policy polarization
Institutional polarization captures the effect-
ive antagonisms between the institutionally
defined groups of veto players V and stake-
holders S. The groups have two properties:
(a) a group policy position x¯v and x¯s for 
veto-players and stakeholders, respectively,
on the reform scale, and (b) a group proportion
V and S for veto-players and stakeholders,
respectively. We assume, rather crudely, that
the group policy position is the average
policy position of group members. Equation
(2) displays the measure of policy polariza-
tion P for a two-point distribution (see
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P v11v
1v1v x¯vx¯s (2)
Because we have a two-point distribution,
the value of institutional polarization
depends much less on polarization sensitivity
parameter . For some values, the polariza-
tion scale even becomes invariant for differ-
ent values of .1 This result has two
important implications. First, the measure
reduces to a weighted measure of policy frac-
tionalization F rather than polarization (with
the weights being intergroup differences).
Second, we can select 0 and further sim-
plify the measure of institutional fractional-
ization as shown in Equation (3).
F2v 1v x¯v x¯s (3)
For 0, institutional fractionalization F is
equivalent to a distance-weighted inverse
Hirschman–Herfindahl concentration index
(see Schneider & Baltz, 2005).2 Esteban &
Ray (1994: 842) verify that, for a two-point
distribution and any given x¯v x¯s, polarization
is maximized at v½. It follows, ceteris
paribus, that when the number of veto-
players perfectly balances the number of
stakeholders, the level of policy fractionaliza-
tion is maximized. This follows intuition,
because neither veto-players nor stakeholders
could counter the other group in terms of rela-
tive group sizes.
Index F is different from the measure of
number of veto-players because it takes into
account both the distance between veto-
players and stakeholders, as an indicator for
the conservatism of veto-players, and the
leverage of veto-players to counterbalance
stakeholders. In highly fractionalized set-
tings, we expect that strong identification
among veto-players and stakeholders fuels
conflict between the two groups. This conflict
would reduce chances for policy reforms,
even if veto-players would consent to some
degree of reform. Hence, we expect a nega-
tive interaction effect between institutional
fractionalization and size of the win-set of the
status quo on the level of policy reform.
H3 (Institutional fractionalization): The
effect of size of the win-set of the status
quo on the level of policy reform is nega-
tively affected by institutional fractional-
ization.
Design and Empirical Data
The reforms under study in the present
article are anti-corruption policies and pro-
vide a ‘litmus test’ for the models of policy
reform. Anti-corruption policies instigate
significant changes in the administrative
system of a country and challenge existing
‘vested interests’ (Geddes, 1991; Haarhuis &
Torenvlied, 2006). Thus, the issues selected
for this study reflect core issues of domestic
policy reform. We selected seven sub-Saharan
African countries for our study, because a large
number of substantive anti-corruption issues
were presented in National Action Plans in
these countries in the period after the year
2000. The foundation for these reform issues
was a World Bank anti-corruption programme,
running from 1999 onwards (World Bank,
1999b). The seven countries that voluntarily
participated in this programme formulated
National Action Plans that contain a variety of
substantive anti-corruption issues to be
debated on the national level. Representatives
of the countries (from government, NGOs,
research institutes and civil society) discussed
the National Action Plans during meetings
at the World Bank in Washington, DC.
1 For example,            , for all values of v and for all values
of x¯x¯ s.
2 This can be easily verified, because the
Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI), defined as
reduces to 12v1vfor any two-point distri-
bution. Since fractionalization measure F is given by
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Over the past decade, the curbing of cor-
ruption has become a key objective of devel-
opment reforms in Third and Second World
countries (World Bank, 1999a,b; Stapenhurst
& Kpundeh, 1999). In its widest definition,
corruption refers to the abuse of public
power for private gain (see Klitgaard, 1988).
To effectively curb corruption, the World
Bank programme promotes a multifaceted
approach, combining civil empowerment
from the bottom-up (e.g. civil society and
media freedoms) with top-down, institu-
tional reforms, to enhance the transparency
and accountability of the state (e.g. adminis-
trative reforms or the strengthening of the
judiciary). The civil empowerment of stake-
holders aims to counterweigh powerful
vested interests and, indeed, the reform
issues included in National Action Plans
cover a wide range of topics that, directly or
indirectly, are believed to reduce corruption.
Appendix A to this article offers a summary
of the issues debated between 1999 and 2001
in the seven countries.
According to World Bank experts (inter-
views 2000, Washington, DC), these seven
countries participated in the World Bank
programme because their state leaders indi-
cated a willingness to formulate a compre-
hensive anti-corruption programme.3 All the
seven African countries, with the exception
of Ethiopia, are presidential systems, so that
we are able to roughly keep constant the
institutional characteristics of the political
system (see Shugart & Haggard, 2001:
71–80). Moreover, all the selected countries
have shown episodes of liberalization that
were not followed by a civil war (Bussmann,
Schneider & Wiesehomeier, 2005).
Data Collection
Data on the anti-corruption reforms were
collected in the period between April and
September 2001, by means of a combination
of content analysis of policy documents and
45 interviews with key informants. In order
to collect the precise, but sensitive, data on
the reform proposals and stakeholder prefer-
ences in these countries, we applied a specific
methodological approach: we conducted
highly structured face-to-face interviews
with multiple key informants in Washington
(informants from all countries), in Kenya
and in Tanzania. In addition, we conducted
telephone interviews with multiple key inform-
ants for all countries. We cross-validated the
data from these interviews with the results
from a desk research of policy-relevant doc-
uments. The key-informant approach to data
collection on collective decisionmaking has
proven to be very valuable in previous studies
of, for example, international politics (Bueno
de Mesquita, 2003), European policymaking
(Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman, 1994) and
policymaking in Western democracies
(Torenvlied, 2000). Key informants are
asked to assess the substantive reform issues
and their alternative outcomes. These out-
comes are mapped to one-dimensional issue
scales, where the distance between alternative
outcomes reflects their substantive dif-
ferences. Subsequently, the informants are
asked to locate stakeholders on the issue
scale, indicate the relative salience of stake-
holders for the various reform proposals, and
provide an estimate of their bargaining
power. Key informants are essential for a
proper assessment of these data, because
decisionmaking processes in general (and in
developing countries in particular) often
have a secretive and informal nature. For this
reason, anonymity was guaranteed, and
neither data nor conclusions can be traced
down to informants.
The World Bank assisted in our efforts to
find knowledgeable and independent key
3 The selection of these countries could potentially bias the
data towards countries that support anti-corruption
reforms. However, one should realize that, at the time of
data collection, these seven African countries were actually
the whole population of aid-receiving countries that were
formulating national anti-corruption reforms.
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informants for the various countries. The
World Bank offered the names of partici-
pants in anti-corruption courses held in
Washington, DC. Moreover, World Bank
country-experts supplied the names of
potential additional key informants based in
the African countries. From these partici-
pants and additional contacts, a final list of
key informants was obtained. Key inform-
ants were selected on the basis of: (a) their
knowledge regarding anti-corruption deci-
sionmaking, (b) their independence from
stakeholders involved in the reform debate
and decisionmaking, (c) their willingness to
make relative judgements about anti-corruption
reforms and (d) their ability to translate quali-
tative judgments into numerical estimates. Of
course, there exists a trade-off between a key
informant’s access to information and her
involvement in policymaking (Torenvlied,
2000: 109–110). Our key informants appeared
to have various backgrounds: members of the
scientific community, editors of nationwide
independent newspapers, high-rank admin-
istrators (staff of anti-corruption agencies),
representatives of national nongovernmental
organizations and interest groups in the field
of anti-corruption, and, incidentally, members
of parliament.
We held 45 well-structured telephone
interviews and interviewed about three special-
ists in the particular domain of anti-corruption
policymaking per country. Interviews were
held in the period between April and
September 2001. On average, about two 
40-minute interviews were held with each
key informant, addressing about five anti-
corruption issues. The key informants have
been interviewed by telephone, which has
several advantages over written or e-mail
surveys (see Bailey & Chang, 2001: 479– 480).
The first, obvious advantage is the combin-
ation of a long distance with a personal inter-
view. Second, telephone interviews facilitate
the questioning of key informants on a larger
range of issues. Third, key informants can be
encouraged to come up with substantive
arguments for their estimates (see also Conklin,
1999: 423; Dillman, 1978). A final advan-
tage of telephone interviews is the higher
response rate and completeness of the data.
To improve the reliability of the informa-
tion provided by the key informants, we
scrutinized the quality of each informant’s
argumentation. As long as there were in-
consistencies or questionable arguments,
new informants were approached for cross-
validation. On average, two to three key
informants were interviewed per issue. The
most reliable estimations of policy prefer-
ences and bargaining power were then
included in the dataset. For Tanzania and
Kenya, the data gathered by telephone inter-
views were validated with data gathered in
face-to-face interviews during field research
in both countries in November 2000 and
June and July 2002. To further improve the
reliability of the information provided by the
key informants, we scrutinized policy docu-
ments, texts of laws and law proposals,
amendments, minutes of meetings, evalu-
ation reports and government dossiers.
Results of these content analyses were subse-
quently used to confront key informants
with possible inconsistencies during the
interview (see Torenvlied, 2000). A potential
problem in key-informant research is retro-
spective bias: informants’ knowledge of past
events is distorted by present information
(Himmelweit, Biberian & Stockdale, 1978).
We expect that this bias is relatively small,
because the investigated decisionmaking
processes were relatively recent.
Selection of Anti-Corruption Reform
Proposals
The selection of reform proposals was a com-
prehensive process, in the sense that this
selection determines the main events in anti-
corruption policymaking in a country (see
Laumann & Knoke, 1987). An inventory
was made of all reform proposals in the
national anti-corruption programmes. Sub-
sequently, the most controversial reform
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issues were selected for further analysis. The
main reason for this selection was to provide
a clearcut description of interest cleavages
and stakeholder alignments which was not
distorted by uncontroversial or symbolic
policy statements. This resulted in a final
selection of 33 reform issues in the seven
African countries. Appendix A shows that
these reform issues cover a wide range of
topics. Some recurring examples of highly
debated reform issues are: ‘To what extent
should the legal definition of corruption be
extended?’, ‘Should the media be granted
legal access to governmental information?’
and ‘Should the anti-corruption bureau be
granted formal prosecution powers, or not?’.
Identification of Veto-Players and
Stakeholders
Studies of political decisionmaking among
veto-players often focus on democratic insti-
tutions, such as the interactions within and
between US Congress and the president, or
between the European Commission, the
European Council and the European
Parliament (Tsebelis, 2002). In these con-
texts, veto-players can be clearly defined
through their legal-institutional position.
Fewer studies are available on domestic
(reform) policymaking in developing coun-
tries, with some notable exceptions for Latin
America (Geddes, 1991; Shugart & Haggard,
2001). Most of these states have an absent or,
at most, weakly developed democratic
system. To better understand the nature of
veto-players and the alignment of their pref-
erences for reform, we cannot simply rely on
the legal context of (democratic) institutions.
To obtain information about the involvement
of veto-players, the donor community and
other stakeholders, we combined informa-
tion from three sources: (a) policy-relevant
documents, (b) key-informants and partici-
pants in domestic decisionmaking, and (c)
country-experts at the World Bank.
In the seven sub-Saharan African countries
under study, we observe the involvement of a
number of powerful policy actors: (1) a
ruling party and (2) a strong leader – most
often a president – dominate in all the polit-
ical systems under study; (3) government
institutions, including ministries and admin-
istrative bureaucracy; and (4) anti-corruption
institutions, including anti-corruption agencies,
the judiciary, audit offices and the auditor-
general. The first three categories most often
benefit from maintaining the status quo in
corruption and survive by protecting special
interest groups (Haarhuis & Torenvlied, 2006).
In order to identify the veto-players from the
list of policy actors, we applied two oper-
ational criteria (Cox & McCubbins, 2001:
24–25). The first criterion is that the veto-
player must be either an individual (a president)
or a collective actor with an organizational
basis for collective action with recognized
membership and leadership, so that the actor
has an unequivocal policy preference (see
Laumann & Knoke, 1987). The second cri-
terion is that the veto-player must have an
exercisable veto, implying that formal power
is delegated to the actor. These criteria were
applied to all reform issues separately (see
Tsebelis, 1995: 295) in the analysis of policy-
relevant documents and in interviews with
key informants.
Furthermore, we observe the involvement
of three categories of policy actors that are
not veto-players but stakeholders: (1) reform-
oriented spokesmen of the media, (2) repre-
sentatives from civil society, including churches,
small businesses and voluntary organizations,
and (3) the international donor community.
The donor community is not a veto-player,
as it lacks a formal mandate to set the agenda
or co-decide with domestic institutions
(Haarhuis & Torenvlied, 2006).
Measurement of Policy Positions and 
Outcomes
The variable policy position was measured
using a combination of well-structured inter-
views with the key informant and close inspec-
tion of policy documents. The measurement
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procedure has been proven to yield informa-
tive and interpretable results (e.g. Bueno de
Mesquita & Stokman, 1994; Torenvlied, 2000;
Thomson, Stokman & Torenvlied, 2003).
Each key informant was asked to reconstruct
the debate on different anti-corruption reform
issues. Using the structured-interview pro-
cedure, issues were transformed into policy
scales, and policy positions of policy actors,
as well as the location of the status quo, were
mapped onto a position somewhere in the
range between 0 and 100. For the position of
the most conservative veto-player, we took
the most extreme-left veto-player. His position
multiplied by two was computed as the size
of the win-set. For the polarization measure
P we applied the commonly used value of
1.0, as well as K2, so that
To measure the level of reform reflected
by an adopted policy, the outcome of deci-
sionmaking was scaled on the reform scale in
the same way as the policy positions and the
status quo. The dependent variable level of
reform was calculated as the distance between
the status quo and the outcome on the policy
scale. The comparability of level of reform
across policy scales is a necessary and defen-
sible assumption in our analyses. It is true
that the difference between the extreme alter-
natives on one policy scale may be much
larger than the difference between the extreme
alternatives on another policy scale in terms
of ‘objective’ measures of reform. However,
in the present article, we are interested more
in the level of reform relative to the distribu-
tion of policy positions and the location of
the status quo on the reform scale, and less
in the substantive interpretation and qualifi-
cation of the level of reform.
Results
In total, we collected data on 33 anti-
corruption reform issues in the seven African










countries (see Appendix A). For two reform
issues (the powers of Kenya’s ‘Anti-Corruption
Authority’ and the extension of prosecution
power of the Malawi anti-corruption bureau),
we were not able to determine the status quo.
For two other issues (procurement proced-
ures and the privatization of state companies
in Tanzania), we were not able to determine
the final reform policy, so that 29 valid cases
remain for analysis. Table I shows summary
statistics for the main independent variables
in our analysis and the dependent variable,
the level of reform. We find significant differ-
ences between the seven countries in terms
of institutional fractionalization of reform,
but not in terms of policy polarization. The
debate on corruption was most fractional-
ized in Ethiopia and least fractionalized in
Bénin and Kenya. Apparently, the institu-
tional distinction between veto-players and
stakeholders generates variation between
issues and between countries. For example,
in Ethiopia, the government faced oppos-
ition from stakeholders (opposition parties,
media, legal profession), but faced very little
opposition from other veto-players. By con-
trast, in Kenya, both veto-players and stake-
holders hold varying positions, so that the
reforms are highly debated within and between
the groups of veto-players and stakeholders.
There exists no empirical relation between
fractionalization and polarization in the 
data (Pearson’s rho0.05, N30, p .81).
The variables size of the win-set and number
of veto-players show considerable variation
between the seven sub-Saharan African 
countries. Variation between countries is also
found in the level of reform. Ethiopia, Malawi
and Uganda adopted hardly any anti-
corruption reforms, while the other countries –
particularly Tanzania and Bénin – show
higher levels of reform. Nevertheless, differ-
ences in level of reform between the seven
countries are not significant.
To test the hypotheses, we performed
ordinary least square (OLS) regressions, with
the level of reform as the dependent variable.
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We pooled the data from the seven countries
in one dataset, because the numbers of cases
within countries are too small to be applic-
able in a multilevel design. Indeed, we found
no significant multilevel structure in the
data.4 Thus, we have some minimal statistic-
al power that enables us to statistically test
for strength and direction of effects. We
note, however, that the relevance of multi-
variate statistical techniques for the present
article lies in testing for strength and direc-
tion, rather than in generalizing to a broad
population of reform issues or countries.
Table II shows the results of our analyses.
The dependent variable is the level of reform
exhibited by the adopted anti-corruption
policies. We tested the veto-player model
first and subsequently added (interaction)
effects of policy polarization and institutional
fractionalization, respectively. In addition to
the variables discussed in the previous sec-
tions, we included a control dummy variable
that captures whether a reform issue has been
discussed at the stage of decisionmaking (1)
or agenda-setting (0). We did not simultan-
eously estimate (interaction) effects of polar-
ization and fractionalization, because of the
low number of cases.
Model 1 is the veto-player model. As expec-
ted, the size of the win-set of the status quo posi-
tively and significantly affects the level of
reform in the cases under study. The core
Hypothesis 1A of the veto-player model is
therefore corroborated. The number of veto-
players also positively and significantly affects
the level of reform, but this effect is quite un-
expected. We derived the opposite hypothesis
and expected a negative effect of the number
of veto-players on the level of reform. Thus,
Hypothesis 1B must be rejected. The result
implies that increasing transaction costs
apparently do not discourage veto-players
from arriving at reforms. The effect of our
control variable is very strong, although the
two variables from the veto-player model sig-
nificantly contribute to the explained vari-
ance of the model (the adjusted R2 of the
bivariate model, including only the control
variable, is 0.38). Overall, the results confirm
that the theoretical-empirical study of veto-
players indeed provides a fruitful explanation
for reforms in the cases under study.
Model 2 is the policy-polarization model
and adds the main effect of polarization and
the interaction effect between size of the win-set
of the status quo and policy polarization.
Neither the main effect of policy polarization
nor its interaction effect with size of the win-set
is significant. Hence, we must reject
Hypothesis 2. Apparently, the level of polar-
ization between different policy coalitions
does not affect the level of reform.5 This
result points at a grouping of policy actors
with similar policy positions that could be
questionable for the reform issues under
study. Policy actors involved in the anti-
corruption reforms apparently identify along
other cleavage lines than their substantive
preferences for reform. Note that the inclu-
sion of the polarization variables does not
change the estimates for the veto-player
model, but that the adjusted R 2 (obviously)
goes down.
Finally, Model 3 is the institutional-
fractionalization model and adds the main
effect of fractionalization and the interaction
effect between size of the win-set of the status
quo and fractionalization. The main effect of
4 A heuristic approach to test for a multilevel structure in
the data is the ‘intra-class correlation coefficient’ (Hox,
1995: 20). The rule-of-thumb is that a multilevel structure
in the data exists if, for each level, the variance is at least
twice as large as its standard error. In our data, we found
that a multilevel model with only a logistic intercept gen-
erates significant variance at the level of the reform issue,
but no significant remaining variance at the country level.
Moreover, the standard error of the measured variance on
the country level (4,016) was almost as large as its variance
(4,829). For this reason, we expect no significant bias in an
estimation of the effects caused by pooling the data.
5 An alternative explanation for the insignificant results of
policy polarization could be that the variation in prediction
errors increases when polarization goes up. We have two
objections to this explanation: (a) it would also apply to
fractionalization, and this variable has a significant effect; (b)
visual inspection of the residuals for both variables does not
reveal this association.
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Table II. OLS-Regressions for Level of Reform Exhibited by 29 Anti-Corruption
Policies (Beta-coefficients; t-values within parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Size win-set status quo, W(SQ) 0.30** 0.33** 0.39***
(2.29) (2.28) (3.04)








Interaction F x W(SQ)  0.22*
(1.68)
Decisionmaking (1Yes) 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.75***
(5.38) (5.10) (5.92)
T-value of constant 2.86*** 1.80* 1.35
R2 adj 0.53 0.49 0.62
N 29 29 29
Two-tailed * p	10; **p	05; *** p	01.
institutional fractionalization is negative and
significant, and the interaction effect with
size of the win-set of the status quo is negative
and significant at a level of p	0.10. Hence,
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed: the more the
groups of veto-players and stakeholders are
balanced and the more they differ in policy
position, the lower the level of reform.
Moreover, the institutional fractionalization
between veto-players and stakeholders reduces
the level of reform that we would expect on
the basis of the size of the win-set of the status
quo. These results indicate that the introduc-
tion of conflict between veto-players and
stakeholders – in terms of an interaction effect
with the win-set of the status quo – is a fruit-
ful extension of the veto-player model, at least
for the cases under study. This is confirmed by
the increase in the adjusted R 2 from 0.53 in
Model 1 to 0.62 in Model 3.
Conclusion and Discussion
We analysed policymaking about 29 anti-
corruption reform issues in seven sub-Saharan
African countries for the years 2000–01.
Anti-corruption reforms provide a ‘litmus
test’ for policy reforms, since they have 
far-reaching consequences for the polit-
ical–administrative structure of ‘weak states’,
and consequently for their political stability.
We applied a spatial model of policy reforms
based on the theory of veto-players, which
defines a specific subset of policy actors
endowed with the formal power to block
proposals for reform. In our application to
anti-corruption policy, these actors often
include the president and ruling party, and
sometimes government agencies. We extended
this model by incorporating conflict with a
broader range of policy actors, such as repre-
sentatives from the media, civil society and
the international donor community.
We tested whether the core variable of
veto-player theory – size of the win-set of the
status quo – predicts the level of reform
(Tsebelis, 2002). As expected, this variable
positively and significantly affects reforms.
Hence, for the anti-corruption reforms under
study, the consent of all veto-players with the
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adoption of higher levels of reform (partly)
determines how strong the reforms will be.
Indeed, veto-player theory provides a mean-
ingful explanation for the anti-corruption
reforms under study and clearly contributes
to our understanding of delicate policymaking
in so-called weak states.
In addition, we studied the effect of the
number of veto-players. We found that the
number of veto-players significantly and posi-
tively affects the level of reform. Thus, if
more veto-players are involved in policymak-
ing, the adopted anti-corruption reform will
represent a larger change from the status quo.
This effect is the reverse of what we would
expect from theory: an increase in the number
of veto-players will never increase the size of
the win-set (Tsebelis, 2002) but will, instead,
raise transaction costs (Cox & McCubbins,
2001). Hence, the number of veto-players is
expected to have either no effect or a negative
effect on the level of reform – but never a pos-
itive effect. An explanation for the positive
effect we find is that veto-players engage in
(cooperative) bargaining rather than non-
cooperative unanimity voting, so that the
adopted reform reflects the positions of all
veto-players rather than the left-extreme.
Another explanation could be that the motive
of re-election is important to veto-players,
even in the countries under study here (with
the exception of Ethiopia, elections were held
in all sub-Saharan countries we studied).
Thus, the addition of institutional veto-players
will likely expand the set of bargaining alter-
natives towards higher levels of reform.
Subsequently, we added political conflict
with the broader range of policy actors
(stakeholders) to the veto-player model.
Because the existence of a non-empty win-set
of the status quo is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for reforms, there is no guar-
antee that reforms will be adopted. We
hypothesized that: (a) the polarization of policy
coalitions that include both veto-players and
stakeholders with similar preferences for
reform or (b) the institutional fraction-
alization of the groups of veto-players and
stakeholders will negatively affect the effect
of the win-set of the status quo on the level
of reform. Policy polarization and institutional
fractionalization will fuel policy conflict
when either there are few policy coalitions 
or the groups of veto-players and stakehold-
ers are in balance, but have quite distant pref-
erences for policy reform.
These effects of policy polarization and
institutional fractionalization will appear as
interaction effects with the size of the win-
set. In our analyses, we find no evidence for
the existence of an (interaction) effect of
policy polarization in our data on anti-
corruption reforms. Instead, we do find a sig-
nificant negative direct effect of institutional
fractionalization, and a relatively strong nega-
tive interaction effect between fraction-
alization and size of the win-set. Apparently,
the identification mechanism that fuels con-
flict in polarized settings affects reform policy-
making through the institutionally defined
groups of veto-players and stakeholders, and
not through coalitions of policy actors with
similar preferences for reform. Therefore,
our study shows that – at least for the anti-
corruption reforms under study – it makes
sense to include political conflict with veto-
players into the analysis of reforms, and not
confine the analysis to conflict within the
subset of veto-players.
The inclusion of a broader set of actors is
particularly relevant when evaluating policy
programmes, such as the World Bank’s, that
aim to empower stakeholders, such as parlia-
mentarians, civil society and the media, in
anti-corruption policymaking. Such efforts
result in an increasingly fractionalized anti-
corruption debate. Our analyses show that frac-
tionalization negatively affects the level of
anti-corruption reform. This would suggest
that the empowerment of societal stakeholders
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has an unintended negative effect on reforms.
It may have motivated veto-players to hold
their own positions more strongly, as the
slightly significant interaction effect with size
of the win-set suggests. This casts some doubts
on the use of ‘civic empowerment’ as an
effective instrument to stimulate reforms in
the short run.
The use of key informants for data col-
lection could potentially have biased our
results, even though we have put consider-
able effort into checking the data. This is an
unavoidable problem for research into the
‘black box’ of collective decisionmaking
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Thomson,
Stokman & Torenvlied, 2003). We empha-
size that our study is limited with respect to
the selection of countries, the selection of
anti-corruption issues and the number of
observations. This is mainly due to the fact
that data collection for this type of analysis is
highly intensive. Therefore, the analyses in
this article aim at illustrating the effects of
polarization and fractionalization when inte-
grated in a veto-player model on a narrowly
defined dataset, rather than a comprehensive
study of anti-corruption reforms in aid-
receiving countries. We should, therefore, be
careful not to extend our interpretations
beyond the controversial anti-corruption
reforms in the seven sub-Saharan African
countries under study.
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Appendix A. Selected Reform Issues
Bénin
1. ‘Loi de Règlement’: parliamentary control
over the government budget (no control –
full control) (2000)
2. Chair of anti-corruption agency (govern-
ment official – independent ‘technical
committee’) (2000)
3. Openness of procurement procedures (no
tenders – open tender procedures) (1999)
Ethiopia
1. Who should draft the ‘code of conduct’ for
the media? (government – media) (2001)
2. Who should lead the new ‘Anti-Corruption
Commission’? (government – independent
stakeholders) (2001)
3. Who prosecutes the corrupt? (government –
independent prosecutor) (2000–01)
4. Legal enforcement of the access to gov-
ernment information (no enforced access –
access to be legally enforced) (2000–01)
Ghana
1. Access to government information (no
access – full access) (2001)
2. Repeal of criminal libel laws (no repeal –
full repeal) (2001)
3. Judicial strengthening (no reforms –
implement reform proposals) (continuing
in 2001)
4. Extension of prosecution powers of the
Serious Fraud Office (no extension –
extension) (2001)
5. Adoption of ‘whistleblower’ legislation to
protect people reporting corruption (no
adoption – adoption) (2001)
6. The declaration by leaders of their per-
sonal belongings (no declaration – full
declaration) (2001)
Kenya
1. Powers of Kenya’s Anti-Corruption
Authority (abolish anti-corruption agency –
independent agency) (2000)
2. Control over parliamentary resources (no
extension – full control) (2001)
3. Legal definition of corruption (exclude
private sector – include private sector)
(2000)
4. Adoption of a ‘list of shame’ by parlia-
ment (reject – adopt) (2000)
5. The amnesty issue: prosecute those who
were corrupt in the past? (grant amnesty –
prosecute past suspects) (2000)
Malawi
1. Extension of the legal definition of cor-
ruption (no extension – include ‘any ir-
regularity’) (2000–01)
2. Amendments to the Corrupt Practices
Act (no amendments – adopt all proposed
amendments) (2000)
3. Extension of prosecution powers of the
anti-corruption bureau (no extension –
extension) (2000)
4. Who should have the burden of proof in
corruption cases? (the anti-corruption
bureau – the suspect) (2001)
Tanzania
1. The declaration by leaders of their per-
sonal belongings (not obliged – obliged)
(2000–01)
2. Openness of procurement procedures (no
tenders – open tender procedures) (2001)
3. Installation of a ‘tax identification system’
(no system – install proposed system) (2001)
4. Privatization of state companies (maintain
state companies – dispose of state com-
panies) (recurring)
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Uganda
1. Maintenance of the system of ‘classified’ gov-
ernment expenditures (maintain – abolish)
(2001)
2. The declaration by leaders of their per-
sonal belongings (not obliged – obliged to
declare in public) (2000–01)
3. Wage level in the public sector (no rise –
raise wages to reduce corruption incentives)
(recurring)
4. Independence of the Auditor General’s
Office (no additional independence – full
independence) (2000–01)
5. Independence of the Inspector General of
Government (IGG)’s Office (no extension –
some extensions) (2000–01)
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